In past articles we addressed tactics used to defeat super-aggressive players. You know them, the kind who fire raises before the flop way too often.
I was playing at the Hard Rock Casino in Catoosa, Okla. — just east of Tulsa — a few months ago while returning from an Alabama trip and met one of these jokers. In a $2-5 No-limit Hold ’em game, this one player was antagonizing everyone with constant pre-flop raises. I mean, EVERY time he was dealt in he made it $18 to go. Position didn’t matter to him, he could have been under-the-gun or the last to act, or on the button; he always raised 3.5 times the big blind. He would then play the hand strongly if he had any piece of it, more often than not getting others to fold out of his sheer aggression.
Others tried to take him on with good starting hands, yet this Bozo seemed to outplay everyone after the flop, especially when opponents didn’t connect (remember the ‘fit or fold’ axiom?). He stacked chips primarily from aggressively betting. Meaning, with enough conviction and size of bet, he convinced people with weak and/or marginal connections to the flop to fold, giving up the pots to him. Granted, every so often another player would hit then play back at him strongly. He then seemed to recognize the danger and muck his hand, leaving the opponent with a Pyrrhic victory; winning the hand, but not having a lot of chips to stack. One of several things I noted about this man’s play was he accepted the fact his stack size had wide swings; he would have a large stack at some points and a smaller stack at others. He was there for action and it seemed to me the accumulation of chips was way down his list of priorities. Okay, then. How to separate him from his “ill-gotten gains?”
One thing a player must determine when first sitting at a table is: What’s the action style here? Are the players mostly tight-aggressive, tight-passive, loose-aggressive (our villain in this story) or loose-passive?
At this table, with our loose-aggressive player dominating the action against tight-passive opponents, I knew if I could isolate the action-junkie from the rest of the players I would have a good opportunity to wreak havoc on him. I played a number of hands having some potential — medium pairs and suited connectors. Although I never saw anything bigger than pocket Jacks and mucked them when they didn’t hit. Then came my chance; the villain had made his usual raise to $18, I called with pocket 9’s and got two callers after me. The flop came 9-4-5 rainbow: I had top set with no straight or flush draws, so I said to myself: “Self, it’s this hand to make your night or it’s back to the hotel room.”
The PEH (Player Everyone Hated) made his usual continuation bet of about half the pot and I called hoping someone caught some of that and would raise. The next player folded and the last to act obliged by re-raising the bet by half the pot again. The bad guy thought about it for a little while (his lips were moving while he counted down the pot),
| “Ten out of nine people don’t understand odds.”
- Jimmy ‘the Greek’ The odds of flopping a straight-flush draw with suited connectors is 3.4%…or about one time out of 33. |
then he just called. Now I began thinking about what his hand could be. He didn’t re-raise, so I did not put him on an over-pair to the flop. Any straight or flush draw required runner-runner to get there, so the best he could have was two over-cards or at best a smaller set than mine. The other consideration — what could the raiser have? Perhaps a big pair and, seeing no danger in the flop, thought he was good … so I just called. The turn was another five, giving me a full-house and second-nut hand. Time to spring the trap.
The PEH then made an unusual bet, only one-tenth the size of the pot. A smaller bet like that means one of two things: 1) He’s acting weak with a hand he thinks is strong and is attempting to induce a bet he can re-raise; or 2) He is sensing some strength in his opponents and wants to see what they will do. I used some of my time to think things through, so I bet about one-third the size of the pot and the other player went all-in for slightly more than my bet. The PEH called, as did I. The river was a great scare card, the Ace of Spades. He quickly went all-in and I called for less than his bet. He said “I missed” but didn’t turn over his hand (in addition to being obnoxious, he was an angle-shooter as well — but that’s for another article). I just stared at him, waiting for him to turn the cards face up or muck them. The dealer obliged by asking him for action, he said he had a straight draw then mucked the cards. I turned my cards face up and the last player, lamenting his two pair, mucked as well.
After being patient for a long time, then flopping – and turning – an almost unbeatable hand and playing meekly, I induced two players to come along for the ride with second-best hands and draws. The results of that pot paid for the airplane fuel there and back. Another benefit of thinking about poker.
