The “all-in” move gets much television exposure due to the alleged drama of the moment; one player places all his chips – and tournament life – on the line with theatrical flair forcing the opponent to go “into the tank” of deep thought in an attempt to figure out what the all-inner has and/or why that move was employed at that particular time.
That’s quite a sentence but it packs a lot of meaning. We regularly
see this all-in move in televised poker because of the “reality show” mindset of the viewers. No-one would long watch a show where someone raises and everyone else folds – which most often occurs during tournaments, especially when the money is close at hand. Sometimes the all-in move is out of desperation. A short stack sees the increasing blinds and antes pressuring his meager pile and so must make a move in hopes of prevailing to extend tournament hopes a while longer.
I have seen some use the all-in move as purely a bullying tactic, one of pure aggression with not much backing up the play. Perhaps they have a huge chip lead and are attempting to run over the table that way. Yes, the opponent knows the “all-inner” most likely does not have anywhere near a hand strong enough but a call places chips at risk. The bully could get lucky and get there; he really could have a hand this time; do I really want to risk elimination with A – 9? This occurs time and time again: No-one could possibly have those many good hands to do that move so many times in so short a time span. But they do it until someone else wakes up with a more powerful hand and zaps them.
There are times, though, when a player’s all-in move can be used against them to great profit. Playing in a somewhat quiet $1 – $2 NL game the other week one of my opponents a few seats ahead of me made a standard three-times the big blind raise before the flop. I looked down at pocket Kings and, being in late position, decided to slow-play them until I saw the flop. With only one other caller we saw the flop of Q-9-6 rainbow. At that time I felt that the opponent would not have raised with any combination of the flop cards, so I considered my Kings to be the best hand. A pot-sized bet by the original raiser I felt was an interrogatory to see where he was. If I called he could put me on a queen, maybe a 10-J for an outside straight draw, perhaps even a set.
I called the wager with the third opponent folding his cards, so now it was head’s up play. The only hands which could beat me were a set (he could have raised with pocket Queens or pocket 9’s, most likely not with pocket 6’s) or pocket Aces. The turn brought a blank and he went all-in for his last chips, about $85. I still felt my Kings were good yet still vulnerable if he had one of those few hands that could beat me, so I called. He turned over A – Q for top pair, top kicker; the river didn’t help and I pulled in the pot.
His all-in was a make-or-break move; he had a legitimate hand (top pair, top kicker) and when faced with some opposition (my call of his pre-flop raise) he felt he had the best hand and attempted to maximize his profit with an all-in move. Unfortunately for him, I had slow-played my hand into the flop and thus had a fairly well-disguised hand.
Playing a hand such as Pocket Kings slowly like I did is not without risk. I have mentioned in these articles more than once that Pocket Kings are nothing but “Ace-finders.” I was fortunate my opponent paired his Queen and not his Ace, for if that were the case I would have been forced to make a difficult decision about folding my cowboys.
Next article in this series will address how a misread and an all-in bet brought a quick end to tournament hopes. In the meantime, keep thinking about poker.
